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Abstract 
Turkey’s New Company Law paved the way for its national stock exchange to be the first 
in the world to require the issuers change their company statutes in order to allow 
electronic participation and voting at their general assemblies. A recent regulation 
mandated all listed companies to use a single electronic portal to allow shareholders to 
participate and vote electronically in general assemblies with immediate effect. The move 
is one in a series of reforms in support of Istanbul International Financial Center Project. 
The Financial Times refers to the new regulation as a coup for international institutional 
investors with Turkish holdings as it increases the transparency of ISE listed companies 
and empowers them to embrace an activist approach. This commentary discusses the 
possible consequences of the new regulation. 
1. Introduction 
“Regulation Regarding Participation to General Meetings of Joint Stock Companies on 
Electronic Medium” (EGMS Regulation) issued by the Turkish Republic Ministry of 
Customs and Trade on the 28th August 2012 (no: 28395) and associated procedural 
rules1 marked Turkey as the first country to require companies listed on its stock 
exchange (Istanbul Stock Exchange, ISE) to allow shareholders, custodians and 
intermediaries to participate and vote at general shareholders meetings (GMs) via an 
electronic platform. Article 1527 of the New Commercial Law2 (NCL) established the 
legal basis that electronic participation and voting have the same legal consequences as 
physical participation and voting for all joint stock companies, while providing electronic 
GMs compulsory for listed companies. The electronic platform for GMs has been 
                                                 
1 Communiqué on the Electronic General Assembly Meeting System Used in General Assembly Meetings of 
Joint Stock Company Official Gazette number 28396 and dated 29 August 2012. The Communiqué regulates 
establishment, operations, and technical issues regarding electronic general assembly meetings and principles and 
procedures on security criteria. 
2 Turkish Commercial Law dated 13.01.2011 and numbered 6102, effective as of 1st July 2012, covers 
Company Law in its Second Book. 
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Melsa Ararat and Muzaffer Eroğlu, 
faculty at Sabancı University School of Management and University of Kocaeli Law School, 
respectively. 
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introduced to remove barriers to effective cross-border voting whilst also complying with 
developing international standards.3 The new regulations also provide the procedures for 
unlisted joint stock companies to offer electronic GMs on an optional basis.4  
While electronic proxy voting is common practice across Europe and the USA, it is not 
compulsory. Outside Turkey global custodian banks typically bear the responsibility for 
organizing voting for their institutional shareholder clients, rather than the company 
itself, and it is overwhelmingly done via electronic proxy voting. Share blocking, late 
timing of disclosures, requirements for disclosure of beneficial owners and restrictions on 
partial or split voting are typical barriers to efficient proxy voting in many countries 
including Turkey, in addition to costly and onerous power of attorney (PoA) 
requirements. The EGMS Regulation and the associated procedures laid out by the NCL 
remove all these barriers to shareholder voting in Turkey. 
The EGMS Regulation became effective 01 October 2012, so going forward, all listed 
companies that make announcements for general assembly meetings must comply with 
the requirements of the regulation and use the electronic platform (e- GEM) developed 
and managed by MKK, the Central Securities Depository Institution — a subsidiary of 
Settlement and Custody Bank and the ISE. e-GEM, in addition to facilitating electronic 
voting, also provides a single source for all company disclosures and functions as a 
centralized medium of communication between investors and issuers. Galatasaray Sportif 
A.S. will hold the first compulsory electronic GM on 30 October 2012. 
The regulations should be seen as one in a series of reforms undertaken by the 
government to promote Istanbul as a regional financial centre, part of the Istanbul 
International Financial Center Project,5 which includes a forthcoming Capital Markets 
Law as well as a recent ruling by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT), 
requiring listed companies to have boards with at least 1/3 independent members, who 
will have the fiduciary responsibility to approve the related party transactions, and further 
empowering minority investors to veto the nominees if the candidate(s) fail to meet the 
independence criteria.6  
2. Background to the EGMS Regulation 
The NCL took long years of drafting by an expert commission led by Prof. Ünal 
Tekinalp, with lengthy deliberations and frequent amendments before finally being 
adopted by the Turkish Parliament.7 During its drafting, the NCLgained support from all 
                                                 
3 The regulation is fully compliant with European Shareholders Rights Directive and Market Standards on 
General Meetings and Principles for an Effective and Efficient Proxy Voting System approved by the U.S. Council of 
Institutional Investors. 
4 A privately held joint stock company (KPGM Turkey) successfully conducted the first online GM on 19 October 
2012. See at http://www.dunya.com/eco_news_detail.php?id=39761 
5 As per the High Planning Council decision dated 29.09.2012 number 2009/31 
6 Communiqué Serial: IV, No: 56 on Principles Regarding Determination and Application of Corporate 
Governance Principles (date of official gazette: 30.12.2011) 
7 The Law numbered 6335 dated 30.06.2012 was enacted just 1 day before the NCL became effective. The 
Law introduced many changes to the NCL. These amendments especially focused on independent audit and disclosure 
requirements for limited liability companies. For example, a compulsory independent audit requirement for all limited 
liability companies has been restricted only to large companies (possibly %1 of all limited liability companies). These 
amendments were a result of powerful lobby by companies on government to reduce burden of regulation on business. 
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political circles and stakeholders; its enactment was the product of exceptional social and 
political accord. The NCL aligns Turkish company law with European Union law, and 
further authorizes CMBT as the regulator for corporate governance matters for all joint 
stock companies. 
One of the objectives of the Istanbul Financial Center Project is to improve investor 
protection and empowerment through enhanced disclosure. Facilitation of electronic 
cross-border proxy voting operations through an electronic portal was seen as an 
important part of this initiative since foreign shareholders own 60-70% of stocks traded 
on the ISE.8  
The new regulation abolishes the requirement for share blocking before GMs, one of the 
most common barriers for proxy voting. This was possible thanks to the ISO 27001 
certified MKK system, which can provide issuers with up-to-date positions on the day of 
the general meeting, in line with the European Shareholder Rights Directive9 Article 7 
which states that Record Date regulations shall not be applicable to companies that are 
able to identify their shareholders from a current register on meeting day. The MKK 
system also abolishes the PoA obligation under the NCL Article 429 for custodians 
(authorized intermediaries and banks) since the details of aggregated beneficiary accounts 
held by the custodians can be traced by them. 
3. How Does Electronic General Meetings (e-GEM) Work? 
The e-GEM system enables hybrid general meetings covering both physical and 
electronic attendance. According to the Article No. 5 Paragraph 3 of the EGMS 
Regulation, the MKK portal facilitates real-time electronic participation in general 
assembly meetings, including submission of proposals, comments and voting, 
simultaneously with the physical meeting. Electronic-only GMs are not allowed. Existing 
and prospective beneficial shareholders can register their votes in advance of the meeting 
by proxy, but still have the opportunity to change their votes during the GM if they 
register and attend electronically. The process will start with issuers publishing their call 
for a GM at least 21 days in advance on e-GEM portal and uploading all the proxy 
materials. The GM will be broadcasted via streaming video by MKK.10 Investors and 
their local custodians can enter the system via their computers or mobile devices 
wherever they are located using the electronic signatures regulated by E-Signature Law.11 
Partial and split voting are also allowed in electronic voting and votes are aggregated 
based on the final positions at 11.59 pm on GM minus 1. The system allows concurrent 
attendance to multiple GMs by the same user. Meeting information and voting reports 
will be instantly communicated to all related parties via e-GEM and vote confirmations 
will be available no later than 15 days to any requesting party. e-GEM will also as a 
forum for existing and prospective shareholders to communicate with each other such as 
                                                 
8 English language materials are optional on e-GEM, so their availability is at the company’s discretion, as is the 
provision of simultaneous translation during the general meeting. 
9 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies 
10 The transfer of data from the GM venue to Content Delivery Networks (CDN/hosting) will be through Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL). “Token Algorithm” will be used to prevent unauthorized access. 
11 E-Signature Law No. 5070 Published in the Official Gazette No. 25355, January 23, 2004. 
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in the case of proxy solicitation as well as with the issuer. Meeting documents, audio-
visual records and voting results will be electronically archived by MKK. The system 
will also be integrated to the existing Public Disclosure Platform12 on which issuers have 
to upload up-to-date information on ownership structures, board composition and board 
members’ roles, shareholdings and affiliations. 
4. Determinants of Voting by Institutional Shareholders 
Institutional investors are major players not just in developed markets; their role is 
rapidly growing in emerging markets as well.13 They influence financial markets through 
their role as the predominant buyers and holders of corporate securities. Their monitoring 
role enhances corporate value and hence the value of exchanges.14 While the evidence 
shows an increase in institutional investors’ activism during the last decade15 there is 
little direct evidence on the determinants of their attendance and voting in general 
shareholder meetings. Ararat and Yurtoglu16 tackle these questions by analyzing the 
institutional and company specific determinants of the tendency of institutional investors 
to participate in the shareholder meetings and cast their vote. They do so by studying 
cross country panel data provided by Broadridge, a company which offers proxy 
processing services to institutional clients of custodian banks globally. The data reveal 
that there is substantial variation in the ratio of voted ballots across countries. In the same 
paper the authors also focus on the ISE using a cross sectional data provided by 
Broadridge to observe the voted ballots and the direction of voting at the firm level in 
2008. 
Their analysis show that physical attendance and share blocking requirements have a 
strongly negative impact on the percentage of ballots being voted in a country, whereas 
cumulative voting has a strongly positive effect. The authors suggest that elimination of 
share blocking before the GMs may induce institutional shareholders to take more active 
stance in monitoring firms, which in turn may improve holding periods. On the other 
hand, results also show that institutional investors refrain from casting their vote when 
firms are more transparent on their board structures and board procedures. This finding 
suggests that the regularities of board structures and board processes of ISE firms 
negatively affect the willingness to vote. 
5. Why the Disclosure on Boards of ISE Firms Negatively Affect the Willingness of 
Investors to Vote 
                                                 
12 See Public Disclosure Program, available at http://www.kap.gov.tr/yay/English/ek/ 
13 Khorana, A., Servaes, H., and Tufano, P. (2005) Explaining the size of the mutual fund industry around the 
world, Journal of Financial Economics 78, 145-185. 
14 Ferreira, M.A. and Matos,P. (2008), The Colors of Institutions’ Money: The Role of Institutional Investors 
Around the World Journal of Financial Economics 88 499-533 
15 Gillan, S.L. and Starks, L.T., The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States (2007). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959670 
16 Ararat, M. Yurtoglu, B.B. ‘Uluslararasi Kurumsal Yatirimcilarin Genel Kurullara Katilimi ve Oy Kullanma 
Egilimleri’ http://cgft.sabanciuniv.edu/tr/AnaSayfa/documents/2009IIBehavior.pdf p. 5. (Last accessed 15 October 2012). 
 5 
The ownership structure of the largest corporations in Turkey (publicly or privately held) 
is based on family control through pyramidal cross-ownership structures.17 The number 
of companies listed on the ISE is relatively few (currently at around 400) and a few 
powerful families control the majority of these companies. Flotation rates are low at 
around 20-30%. Shareholders use control-enhancing mechanisms such as privileged 
classes of shares that allow them to nominate and elect directors single handedly even 
when their economic rights are lower than 50%. 
While foreign institutional shareholders hold a majority of traded shares, domestic 
institutional investors are largely absent in Turkey. Although local pension funds are 
rapidly growing, they are still fairly small and their equity investment is only a fraction of 
their total investments. Investor activism at present is not noticeable at ISE-listed 
companies. 
In order to increase the holding periods and promote strategic investments through 
empowering investors, Article 428 of the NCL has introduced the concept of an 
institutional representative, allowing the pooling of individual shareholders’ voting 
rights, and their exercise collectively.18 The NCL facilitates proxy solicitation by 
allowing these shareholder representatives to collect proxies for voting in a certain 
direction similar to the proxy system provided by the US law. Thus e-GEM enables low 
cost proxy fights, although the concentrated ownership structure will limit the success of 
such efforts. Underpinned by the NCL, EGMS Regulation allows appointment of 
institutional representatives on the e-GEM system. 
6. Consequences of e-GEM 
Investors found it hard to justify the cost of voting and the loss of liquidity by blocking 
their shares in the presence of highly concentrated ownership structures and voting 
privileges in Turkey. The new system reduces the cost of proxy voting for investors and 
removes the share blockage requirement, but does not solve all the problems limiting 
voting. Recent amendments to the CMBT’s corporate governance rules that give minority 
investors the power to challenge the board nominations for independent members and 
mandate the companies to disclose the nominees for independent director when they 
publish the call for the GM may encourage voting. This is a big step forward from the 
previous practice whereby only shareholders at the GM could nominate board members. 
The investigation of Broadridge data showed that, in the past, institutional investors 
categorically voted against the nomination for board members when there was no prior 
disclosure of the nominees. The new regulation not only requires that companies must 
disclose independent nominees and their backgrounds at the time of the call, but 
empowers the shareholders to register their objections to the nominations with the CMBT 
                                                 
17 Ararat, M. and Yurtoglu, B.B. ‘Corporate Governance in Turkey: an Introduction to the Special Issue’ (2006) 
14 Corporate Governance, p. 2001; Yurtoglu,B.B. ‘Ownership, Control and Performance of Turkish Listed Firms’(2000) 
volume 27 (2) Empirica, p. 193-222. 
18 The CMBT Corporate Governance Guidelines also recommend cumulative voting for board appointments and 
the NCL (article 434/4) allows joint stock companies to adopt cumulative voting provided that it is included in their articles 
of associations. However, none of the listed companies has so far adopted it. Cumulative voting is mandatory for unlisted 
companies with more than 500 shareholders. 
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if the nominees do not meet the independence criteria. These two factors may encourage 
a higher participation of international institutional investors at e-GEMs. 
Even though compulsory e-GEM system seems an important development regarding 
improving shareholder participation on GMs in Turkey, there could be some unwanted 
consequences. Firstly, it creates costs for companies, as they have to hold both online and 
physical GMs at the same time. Secondly and more importantly, problems encountered in 
maintaining voting integrity and in the use of shareholder rights through e-GEM system 
might increase the annulment of GMs by courts. Given lengthy law suits in Turkey, this 
could put companies at risk of being unable to function effectively. Thirdly, the 
regulation may still be watered down if controlling shareholders lobby against the system 
if it does not operate smoothly and without legal or other problems.19  
7. Conclusion 
The Financial Times refers to the new regulation as a coup for international institutional 
investors with Turkish holdings as it increases the transparency of ISE listed companies 
and empowers them to embrace an activist approach.20  
While this is to an extent true and the new rules undoubtedly mark a major advance for 
shareholder rights in Turkey, it does not automatically make Turkey the best country for 
investor protection and investor empowerment. Protection of investors and creating 
shareholder democracy require more than facilitation of crossborder participation and 
voting in GMs. As long as the highly concentrated ownership structure and/or privileged 
classes of shares prevails, the e-GEM system will offer no more than increased visibility, 
and timeliness of disclosure. Thus, the EGMS Regulation’s main effort must be on 
facilitation of real and equal participation in decision-making by shareholders in Turkish 
companies in order for it to be considered an effective piece of legislation. Cumulative 
voting may be a step forward in the transition to more dispersed ownership and a deeper 
stock market in Turkey. 
Together with NCL and forthcoming Capital Market Law, Turkish companies are going 
through a transition period at a time when Turkey is close to becoming investment grade. 
The real effect of EGMS Regulation will be tested in a few years while the transition 
period is over. Other exchanges should watch ISE’s experience closely. 
  
 
                                                 
19 Turkey has enthusiastically introduced changes to its company law systems and Corporate Governance 
Principles in recent years. However, some of these changes have met with strong resistance from corporations and have 
been watered down with frequent amendments. 
20 See Financial Times, Turkey Moves first on E-voting (07 October 2012) available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a13afde-0e2e-11e2-8d92-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz28jP5aq00 
